Laurent Gbagbo’s military position is weakening as business friends help him to break his rival’s ban on cocoa exports

Trade sources in Moscow and London report that business allies of Laurent Gbagbo have begun exporting cocoa out of the port of San Pedro in defiance of President-elect Alassane Dramane Ouattara’s export ban. Last month, the officially recognised President called for the ban, which he has extended to the end of March. He promised action against traders who violate the ban, which has the United Nations’ backing, and all the major buyers have complied. The European Union has forbidden any EU-flagged vessel from lifting cocoa. The export ban will carry on into April, we hear.
A key player in Gbagbo’s operation is Ali Lakiss, the Lebanese Managing Director of the Société Amer et Frères Cacao (SAF-Cacao), the biggest locally-owned cocoa company, who manages the exports, say European-based traders. We hear Lakiss is close to Simone Gbagbo, wife of the losing presidential candidate, who has major interests in the cocoa business. These efforts may help Gbagbo’s finances but his military position is steadily worsening (AC Vol 52 No 4 & AC Vol 52 No 5).
Hopes that diplomatic efforts will produce a resolution are diminishing following Gbagbo’s rejection of the African Union’s reiteration of its recognition of Ouattara as legitimate President and its proposal that he head a national unity government including politicians from Gbagbo’s camp. That assumes Gbagbo would be prepared to go quietly but in fact he is looking more than ever grimly determined to hang on, even with growing doubts about his support within the official army.
There are growing ructions within the military and we hear that a very senior officer has been openly grumbling about the damaging effects of the current impasse. This suggests not only that some top army people no longer back Gbagbo, but also raises the prospect of the army not handing over power to Ouattara should they mount a putsch against an intransigent Gbagbo.

Rumours swirl around the military that the fighters who tried to storm Army Chief General Phillipe Mangou’s house on 14 March were dissidents from his own forces – rather than the pro-Ouattara ‘invisible commandos’ some had blamed. Some think dissatisfied generals could have encouraged the attack on Mangou: he criticised the army’s killing of six women in a demonstration in the Abobo suburb of Abidjan, two weeks ago. His remarks further damaged relations with the generals who are really in control.
Long march south
Guerrilla fighters in the Forces Nouvelles, loyal to Ouattara, are marching southwards. They have been pushing through the former United Nations-patrolled buffer zone dividing the country. FN fighters are on the offensive in the west, trying to stop Liberian mercenaries paid by Gbagbo from crossing the border. We hear both sides are using mercenaries but Gbagbo is much more reliant on them. The daily rate for a Liberian mercenary is around US$500, another drain on the outgoing President’s finances. Guillaume Soro, Ouattara’s nominee as prime minister, a post he held under Gbagbo, was FN leader and has again been out on the western front guiding policy.
The main locus of conflict is in Abidjan, where Gbagbo’s forces face growing pressure. On 14 March, insurgents supporting Ouattara advanced within striking distance (about four kilometres) of the presidential palace, which Gbagbo rarely leaves, and the state television station, Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI), which backs his cause. Well supplied and highly motivated, these insurgents are making inroads against Gbagbo’s men. So far, they have treated civilians with some respect but there are reports of summary executions of captured Gbagbo soldiers.

Another casualty of the fighting is the reputation of the Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire. As the UN management hired mainly local staff three years ago, there are many Gbagbo-loyalists in the organisation who leak information on a daily basis. Security breaches include operational plans for the use of attack helicopters. UN Special Representative Choi Young-jin faces criticism from all sides. Some claim he deliberately overlooks breaches of security by both sides in the belief that this shows his neutrality. To the protagonists, this looks like weakness. Both local people and UN staffers criticised Choi’s refusal to send in armoured cars when civilians were attacked in front of ONUCI headquarters. In that incident, the vehicles positioned themselves between Gbagbo’s soldiers and civilians before suddenly withdrawing.

While the shooting continues, the quest for resources to sustain Gbagbo’s regime also continues. This week, a Russian ship was due to dock at San Pedro and fill its hold with cocoa. Before Gbagbo nationalised the cocoa industry this month, the Bourse du Café et du Cacao (BCC) carried out an inventory, estimating 340,000 tonnes of cocoa were stored in warehouses, which could bring the state 65 billion CFA francs ($137.86 million) in tax. About 100,000 tn. are ready for export.

Only a few of the smaller registered exporters acceded to demands to open their warehouses but the general view is that Gbagbo’s men will not use force to make the companies comply. Larger companies are refusing because the beans will keep for several more weeks and also because they do not want to break Ouattara’s export ban.

Small-scale smuggling is on the increase. Smugglers can obtain a document from customs stating that the beans have spoiled and since they are below export quality, they need to go back to the farm for drying. They then move the beans east to Ghana. Stocks are very high because of the political crisis but another harvest season runs from 1 April to 31 September. This usually accounts for about 350,000 tn. The BCC is forecasting a bumper total of 1.2 mn. tn.